purpose

By services, 20 August, 2023

The appellant was assessed under s. 103(1). A representative of the appellant (Mr. Thompson, who wholly-owned it) refused to answer questions posed on his examination for discovery that were designed to elicit the reason or purpose for which various transactions were engaged in by the appellant and other companies in the group.

After referring to the “principal reason” test in s. 103(1), Sommerfeldt J stated (at para. 42):

By services, 10 May, 2017

The appellant, a registered charity, operated a summer lakeside camp which provided camp experiences for younger and older children, as well as seniors’ and family retreats. The attendants were mostly evangelical Christians. Bell JTCC found (at para. 31) that “the Appellant's sole purpose was the conduct of a Christian camp including evangelising for the conversion of persons to the religious beliefs it espoused.” In finding that the camp was not a place of amusement, he stated (at para. 34):

By services, 28 November, 2015

In 2002, the taxpayer was resident both in Canada and the U.K. for domestic tax purposes, but by virtue of Art. 4, para. 2(a) of the Canada-U.K Income Tax Convention (the "Convention") he was a resident of the U.K. for purposes of the Convention. S. 250(5) of the Act, which otherwise might have explicitly deemed his non-residence under the Convention to apply for purposes of the Act, did not apply to him in 2002.

By services, 28 November, 2015

After the taxpayer solicited competing bids for the sale of a significant block of shares it held in another public company ("Falconbridge") both directly and through a holding company ("McIntyre"), it accepted an offer of Falconbridge that required Falconbridge to declare and pay a significant dividend on all the outstanding shares of Falconbridge, and (following the payment of a corresponding dividend by McIntyre) to purchase the shares of Falconbridge and McIntyre held by the taxpayer.

By services, 28 November, 2015

In the course of applying s. 245 to deny the recognition by the taxpayer of a capital loss, the Court considered and rejected the argument of the taxpayer's principal (Mr. Cross) that his primary intention in entering the series of transactions in issue (which effected a surplus strip) was creditor protection, and that "each and every step in the plan was essential" to achieving such protection. Sharlow J.A. stated (at para. 20):