Each appellant, which was a for-profit operator of a B.C. residential care home (in the case of "CH") or a B.C. assisted living facility (in the case of "CT"), was invoiced periodically, based on an flat hourly rate, by a third-party independent contractor ("HARPS," or "SimpeQ," respectively) for the services of their "care aides" (who performed personal services and provided assistance to residents with the activities of daily living, including bathing, dressing, grooming, transferring, skin, nail and mouth care, meal preparation and feeding, washroom and medication assistance and incontinence management), in the case of CH, "activity aides" (who focused on social activities for the residents), as well as laundry and housekeeping services for both homes. The regional health authority ("FHA") funded "Health Services" including assistance with the activities of daily living including bathing, dressing, grooming, transferring, feeding, incontinence management, and emotional and social support, but not "Hospitality Services" including social and recreational programs, laudry and "homemaking" services.
At the time, Pt. II, s. 1 provided:
"homemaker service" means a household or personal service, such as cleaning, laundering, meal preparation and child care, that is rendered to an individual who, due to age, infirmity or disability, requires assistance.
In response to a Crown submission (at para. 41) that "according to the noscitur a sociis rule of statutory interpretation, the term ‘personal service' would be restricted to services similar in nature to the examples set out in the definition: cleaning, laundering, meal preparation and child care," Paris J stated (at paras. 46-47):
[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of "personal service" would clearly encompass such services assistance with the activities of daily living such as were provided to the residents of Courtyard Terrace and Cartier House, due to their age, infirmity or disability. …
The use of specific examples after a general term in legislation does not restrict the meaning of the general term to cases similar to the specific examples. Rather, the presumption is that, in using the specific examples, Parliament intended to extend the meaning of the general term to things that would ordinarily have been seen as not falling within the general term. This principle of interpretation was discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in National Bank of Greece v. Katsikonouris, [1990] 2 SCR 1029… .
See summaries under Sched. V, Pt. II, s. 13 and s. 138.