The taxpayer's employer, General Motors, frequently assigned new vehicles to its executives and senior managers, the taxpayer included, in order to promote the vehicles and identify shortcomings in the models. The Minister authorized GM in 1982 to use a simplified method for calculating the value of employee benefits, which was meant to approximate the value of the personal use for the vehicles. Since then, s. 6(1)(k) was enacted, setting out the formula applicable to the taxpayer's situation.
In affirming that the Minister could assess the taxpayer for 2008-2009 for an imputed benefit under s. 6(1)(k) on a basis contrary to the authorization, Woods J dismissed the taxpayer's argument that, because the authorized method dispensed with detailed record keeping, the Minister should have the onus of proving the cost of the vehicles, and the kilometers driven for personal use. This argument relied on the authorization being valid for the relevant taxation years, and Woods J had already found it wasn't - see summary under General Concepts - Estoppel.
Regarding the taxpayer's further argument that the Minister's assumptions were "arbitrary, capricious, and not founded in any facts," Woods J stated (at para. 58):
I agree with Mr. Szymczyk that the assumed facts are partly arbitrary, but this is not a reason for the Crown to bear the burden of proof. The burden of proof with respect to pleaded assumptions is placed on taxpayers because the facts are usually within the taxpayers' knowledge or control.
However, the taxpayer's appeal with respect to the Minister's assessment of an imputed benefit under ss. 6(1)(e) and 6(2) was allowed as the taxpayer was delivered a new vehicle every three months, the Minister's assumption that the taxpayer had 20,004 kilometers per year of personal use did not recognize that "the legislation requires that personal use be calculated separately for the periods that each automobile was made available" (para. 70), and no evidence as to actual personal use was advanced.