Jorré found that the taxpayers' flight simulators could be depreciable property in a taxation year where the taxpayer rented the simulator out (thereby allowing the taxpayer to deduct capital cost allowance), but also be inventory in the year the simulator is sold (thus forcing the taxpayer to treat the resulting gain as business income rather than a capital gain). In reaching this conclusion, Jorré J. noted that the Court in Friesen ([1995] 3 S.C.R. 103) made a comment indicating that his approach might be "inconsistent with the basic division in the Income Tax Act between business income and capital gain." Although he ultimately concluded that his findings did not contradict Friesen, he stated (at para. 139):
Does the excerpt from Friesen that I just quoted [regarding the income/capital gain division] apply? We are no longer in the era where Lord Halsbury stated that a judgment is authoritative solely for the issue it decides and nothing more. Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Sellars v. The Queen [[1980] 1 S.C.R. 527], it has been clear that the Supreme Court's decisions have broader scope than they would under Lord Halsbury's classic approach.