THOTSON, P.: In this appeal the appellant, who is legislative counsel for the Province of Manitoba and Deputy Superintendent of Insurance, and also insurance counsel, contends that the income tax assessment levied against him for the year 1943 is erroneous in that there was added to the amount shown on his return the sum of $25 which he had paid to the Law Society of Manitoba for 1943, being the annual practising fees of $20 and the special assessment of $5 for the reimbursement fund for that year ; he claims that he is entitled to a deduction of this amount from the amount of his salary. The legal questions involved are similar to those in the case of Bond v. Minister of National Revenue, ante, p 284, in which judgment has just been given.
The appellant is a qualified legal practitioner in the Province of Manitoba, both as a barrister and as an attorney-at-law or solicitor, having been called to the bar and admitted to the rolls in June, 1914. Since such call and admission he has been a member in good standing of the Law Society of Manitoba. He was appointed legislative counsel of the Province of Manitoba and Deputy Superintendent of Insurance by Order in Council No. 1064/41, approved by the Lieutenant-Governor on October 9, 1941, at an annual salary of a fixed amount. Subsequently, by Order in Council No. 845/42, approved September 17, 1942, he was made insurance counsel with such duties in respect of legal matters as might be specified from time to time by the Attorney- General.
The appellant’s duties as legislative counsel are not defined by statute or regulation. While his instructions came mainly from the Attorney-General and his salary comes out of the appropriation for the Attorney-General’s department, he also acts for other Ministers and departments. The appellant gave evidence as to his duties and they are fully set out in Exhibit 5A. He drafts all government legislation laid before the Legislative Assembly and examines and reports on all other legislation; he frequently drafts orders in council and regulations; he is called upon by various departments for legal advice and opinions and to draft and revise contracts, agreements, etc.; he does some solicitor’s work for the Attorney-General’s department; he may be and has been required to appear in Court as counsel on behalf of the Attorney-General in constitutional matters. As insurance counsel he is called upon to advise the Superintendent of Insurance as to matters of insurance law, and he attends the annual conference of the Superintendents of Insurance. He is also one of the Manitoba Commissioners to the Conference on Uniformity of Laws. It is obvious that for the performance of his duties he must have a knowledge of law and practice.
Counsel for the respondent sought to distinguish this case from the Bond case (supra), on the ground that the duties of the appellant were not stated in the order-in-council by which he was appointed; that there was no requirement that the appellant must retain membership in the Law Society of Manitoba for the performance of his duties; and that his duties were not those of a practising lawyer. I am unable to agree. It is quite true that the duties are not specified by any document but they are defined and well known by custom and practice and they are such as could only be properly performed by a member of the legal profession. Moreover, some of them, such as appearing in Court, demand good standing at the bar. The appellant is under the direction of the Attorney-General and performs duties that only a lawyer could discharge. Moreover, I am satisfied that if he did not pay his Law Society annual practising fees and assessments and in consequence of such nonpayment were suspended and struck off the rolls, his carrying on of his duties would constitute unlawful practice of law within the meaning of Sec. 53 of the Law Society Act, R.S.M. 1940, c. 115, as amended in 1943, Statutes of Manitoba 1943, c. 29, Sec. 3, and expose him not only to penalty but also to injunction at the instance of the Law Society. It was, therefore, necessary to the lawful and continuous performance of his duties that he should continue to be a member in good standing of the legal profession ; in that sense, continued membership in the Law Society was a condition of his employment for he could not otherwise perform all his duties.
Under the circumstances. I have come to the conclusion that the position of the appellant in this case cannot be distinguished from that of the appellant in the Bond case (supra). The reasons for judgment in that case are, therefore, incorporated, mutatis mutandis, in this one; and it follows that the appeal must be allowed with costs.
Appeal allowed.