Jean-Paul Fluet v. Minister of National Revenue, [1978] CTC 2902, [1978] DTC 1657

By services, 16 April, 2024
Is tax content
Tax Content (confirmed)
Citation
Citation name
[1978] CTC 2902
Citation name
[1978] DTC 1657
Decision date
d7 import status
Drupal 7 entity type
Node
Drupal 7 entity ID
790658
Extra import data
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"field_full_style_of_cause": "Jean-Paul Fluet, Appellant, and Respondent.",
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Style of cause
Jean-Paul Fluet v. Minister of National Revenue
Main text

Guy Tremblay [TRANSLATION]:—This case was heard in Montreal, Quebec on February 20, 1978.

1. Point at Issue

The question the Board must decide is whether the money spent by the appellant to purchase and maintain a guard dog may be allowed in calculating his income for the 1975 taxation year. The appellant, a wage earner, is a bank manager, and the dog was bought at the recommendation of the police for his protection and that of his family.

2. Burden of Proof

The burden is on the appellant to prove that the respondent’s assessment is incorrect. This burden of proof derives not from one particular section of the Income Tax Act, but from a number of judicial decisions, including the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of Canada in R W S Johnston v MNR, [1948] CTC 195; 3 DTC 1182.

3. Facts

3.1 The appellant is the manager of a branch of a banking institution and a wage earner.

3.2 In recent years two persons were killed in hostage-taking incidents involving employees of this bank.

3.3 The Montreal police department set up a special squad to deal with such crimes.

3.4 This squad recommended to senior bank employees that they purchase a guard dog and install an outside lighting system at the front and back of their houses for the protection of themselves and their families.

3.5 The appellant spent $433, including $75 for a Labrador sheep dog in the 1975 taxation year, to carry out these recommendations.

3.6 The contract of employment did not require the use of such preventive measures.

3.7 The respondent disallowed these expenses in his notice of assessment dated June 14, 1976.

3.8 On August 2, 1976, the appellant filed a notice of objection to which the respondent replied on January 28, 1977, upholding his notice of assessment dated June 14, 1976.

3.9 On February 7, 1977 the appellant appealed to the Tax Review Board.

4. Act

Because the appellant was a wage earner, the only deductions that can be included in calculating his income are those provided for in section 8, as set out by subsection 8(2) of the new Act:

8. (2) General limitation. Except as permitted by this section, no deduction shall be made in computing a taxpayer’s income for a taxation year from an office or employment.

Although some deductions provided for by sections 60 to 66 of the new Act (alimony payments, tuition fees, and so on) may also be included in calculating a wage earner’s income, these sections do not apply in the case ai bar.

To return to section 8, only paragraph 8(1)(a) applies:

8. (1) (a) Deductions of a single amount of $150 (or 3%, and so on) for any employment.

This single amount was allowed.

The following are the titles summarizing the content of the other subsections of section 8, which demonstrate that they do not apply to the case at bar:

8. (1) (b) legal expenses of employee;

(c) clergyman’s residence;

(d) teachers’ exchange fund contribution;

(e) expenses of certain railway company employees;

(f) salesman’s expenses;

(g) transport employee’s expenses;

(h) travelling expenses;

(i) dues and other expenses of performing duties;

(j) automobile costs;

(k) unemployment insurance premium;

(l) and (1.1) contribution;

(m) and (8.6) contribution to registered pension plan;

2) and (3) certain limitations;

(4) meals;

(5) certain annual dues not deductible;

(7) teachers;

(8) employees’ contributions to pension fund for arrears.

5. Comments

The appellant’s chief argument is that the morality squad’s recommendation was justified and that, according to the rules of equity, he should be allowed the expense claimed to protect his life and that of his family.

Although the Board sympathizes with this opinion, it unfortunately cannot legally give effect to it. The Board must interpret the wording of the Income Tax Act as it stands, not as it should be.

If the appellant thinks that this section is in need of change, he will no doubt be further ahead seeking to have the Act changed by Parliament than applying to a court of law for a deduction that the Act does not allow.

6. Conclusion

The appeal is dismissed in accordance with the above reasons for judgment.

Appeal dismissed.