The appellant (“MPP”) was an insolvent, publicly traded, mining company with accumulated net capital losses of $72.7 million. In order for two companies (“Madison” and “Vanac,” which dealt with each other and MPP at arm’s length) to access those losses and shelter gains from portfolios of rental properties, transactions were implemented, which first entailed the existing MPP mining business being transferred to a subsidiary, whose shares were effectively spun-off to the existing shareholders. Now that MPP was an empty shell, Madison and Vanac transferred respective portfolios of rental properties to MPP in consideration for the assumption of liabilities and for the issuance of a mixture of Class B voting shares and Class C non-voting shares (with the same attributes other than being generally non-voting) so that Madison and Vanac collectively held (and in equal proportions, after giving effect to some catch-up transactions to equalize those holdings) 46.6% of the voting rights and 92.8% of the equity of MPP.
Regarding the denial of MPP’s losses under s. 245(2), MPP argued that it had received no tax benefit from the use of non-voting shares because, even if Madison and Vanac each had received only shares in the form of Class B voting shares, each would have acquired 46.4% of the MPP equity, so that neither would have acquired de jure control of MPP. Graham J rejected this submission on the basis that Madison and Vanac had been acting in concert in the transactions, so that, under this alternate scenario, there would have been an acquisition of control of MPP by a group of persons, thereby resulting in the application of s. 111(4).
Graham J went on to find that the transactions were an abuse of the object and spirit of s. 111(4).