CASEY, J.:—This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, district of Montreal, rendered March 3, 1949, holding two of the appellants, Arthur W. Gilmour and Dominic Vincelli in contempt of Court. The facts are these :
In October of 1948 a Winding-up Order was issued against Die-Plast Co. Ltd., and David Grobstein was appointed liquidator. It appears, on the strength of the proceedings before us that one Dorothy Myerson, a shareholder of the Company, had been the owner of the building in which the Company operations were carried on, and that she had leased this building to the Company. It is alleged that this lease had disappeared and also that Dorothy Myerson had sold the immoveable to her father.
In January of 1949, the liquidator made a petition before the Superior Court asking that the sale of the property be set aside and that the lease, of which the written evidence had disappeared, be declared in existence.
This petition was contested, and for the purpose of the hearing, Arthur W. Gilmour and Diminic Vincelli, both employees of the Department of National Revenue, Income Tax Division, were served with subpoenas duces tecum.
It is clear that the petitioner proposed to have these witnesses disclose whatever information concerning the lease they had acquired in their official capacities, and to submit their evidence as an element of proof tending to establish the existence of the disputed agreement.
Present, however, at the hearing was counsel for the Department, who objected to the examination of the appellants and to the production of the documents requested, the latter having been obtained :
«6 . . in pursuance of their official duties solely for the information and use of the taxation Division of the Department of National Revenue and Officials of Taxation Division engaged in the administration and enforcement of the Income War Tax Act and are of such confidential nature that their production would be prejudicial to the public interest . . .”?
To support this objection the affidavit of Mr. V. W. T. Seully, the Deputy Minister of National Revenue was filed. Since this document has a bearing on the issues, it is well to reproduce it immediately :
“1. I have read copies of subpoenas issued on the 25th day of February 1949 at the instance of the petitioners in these proceedings and directed to and served on A. W. Gilmour, Director of Income Tax, 400 Youville Square, Montreal, P.Q., and Dominic Vincelli, c/o Director of Income Tax, 400 Youville Square, Montreal, P.Q., requiring them to attend as witnesses in these proceedings on the 3rd day of March, 1949, at ten-thirty o’clock in the forenoon before Mr. Justice L. Boyer to give evidence and to bring with them reports and documents concerning information given to them on behalf of Die-Plast Company Limited with regard to the lease held by that Company for the premises at 6540 Hutchison Street, Montreal, P.Q.
2. A. W. Gilmour and Dominic Vineelli are officers of the Taxation Division of the Department of National Revenue of the Government of Canada employed in the service of His Majesty in the administration and enforcement of the Income War Tax Act and bound by the terms of Section 81 of that Act.
3. The documents described in the subpoenas are reports or official minutes or correspondence or copies of correspondence setting out or dealing with material or information obtained by or provided to A. W. Gilmour and Dominic Vincelli under the terms of the Income War Tax Act in pursuance of their official duties solely for the information and use of the Taxation Division of the Department of National Revenue and officials of the Taxation Division engaged in the administration and enforcement of the Income War Tax Act and are of such confidential nature that their production would be prejudicial to the public interest and I accordingly object to their production.
4. I am of the opinion that it would be prejudicial to the public interest for A. W. Gilmour and Dominic Vincelli, or either of them, to give vive voce evidence described in the subpoenas or relating to information which they, or either of them, have obtained in the course of their duties as officers of the Taxation Division of the Department of National Revenue engaged in the administration and enforcement of the Income War Tax Act and I accordingly object to such evidence being given.”
The next entry of interest in the procès verbal is the decision on this objection. At page 6 of the Joint Case we read:
‘‘ce n’est pas à un officier du Département du Revenu National de décider si les témoins doivent témoigner ; mais ce droit appartient exclusivement aux Tribunaux de décider en cette matière ; en outre, la compagnie, en assignant les témoins dans sa propre cause, abandonne son privilège ;
Ordre est donné aux témoins de témoigner ; la Cour, les déchargeant de toute responsabilité.”
The two witnesses, Gilmour and Vineelli, were then sworn and after they had refused to testify and to produce the reports and documents requested, they were declared in contempt of Court. The decision of the learned trial Justice was reduced to writing and must now be reproduced:
“ATTENDU QUE:
Le témoin Vincelli, un employé du Département Fédéral du Revenu ayant été dûment assigné et ayant prêté serment, le procureur de département s’est opposé à ce qu’il témoigne en invoquant la loi de la taxe sur le Revenu, a produit un affidavit du Député Ministre du Département des Finances, à l’effet que ses employés ne pouvaient être forcés de témoigner et qu’il leur avait défendu de ce faire et argumenté au même effet en citant certaines décisions où les circonstances n’apparaissaient pas.
Le procureur du syndic a soutenu le contraire en représentant de plus que la Compagnie en faillite représentée par le Requérant consent à l’examen et qu’il était dans l’intérêt de la justice que l’examen ait lieu. La Cour s’étant alors ajournée à 2.15 p.m. jugement est rendu comme suit après délibéré :
CONSIDERANT QUE:
Toute la cause repose sur l’existence d’un bail en faveur de la Compagnie, qui a disparu et le Requérant veut établir qu’il est aux mains du Département et qu’au moins ses officiers l’ont vu alors qu’ils étaient au bureau de la Compagnie Faillie ;
La preuve de ce fait est essentielle et dans l’intérêt de la Justice, un officier du Département n’a ni le droit ni le pouvoir d’interpréter la loi et de décider si un témoin doit répondre et à quelles questions il doit répondre et surtout décider d’avance sans les avoir entendues, la légalité des questions posées plus tard au cours d’un procès.
Ce droit appartient exclusivement aux tribunaux c’est à eux de décider suivant les circonstances.
Dans l’espèce, l’article en question est dans l’intérêt seul du contribuable et il consent, par le Syndic qui le représente, à ce que la preuve soit faite comme il le demande. Il s’agit d’un privilège pour favoriser le contribuable, afin de ne pas nuire à son crédit et auquel il peut renoncer comme au privilège du médécin et de l’avocat et la sanction n’affecte pas la question, mais n’a pour but que d’assurer le privilège. D’ailleurs la question à être posée aux témoins ne s’applique pas au rapport sur le Revenu.
Pour ces motifs, déclare que les dits témoins devront témoigner.
Jugement étant ainsi rendu, les témoins Dominic Vincelli et Arthur Gilmour, de nouveau, furent appelés et assermentés, mais refusèrent péremptoirement, malgré l’order de la Cour, de répondre à toute question, invoquant l’ordre de leur supérieur et ce, pas même à la question à l’effet qu’ils auraient visité le bureau de la Compagnie.
Vu ce que ci-dessus, DECLARE les dits témoins Dominic Vineelli et Arthur Gilmour, en mépris de Cour laissant aux parties tout recours que ce droit.”
In attacking this judgment the appellants argue that they, as officials of the Department of National Revenue, were forbidden by law to disclose the information sought; that C.C.P. 332 is applicable; that documents and papers in the possession of the Department are privileged; and that the Minister of National Revenue is the only person who has the right to decide whether such documents may be produced, and that this power of decision cannot be destroyed by the consent of the taxpayer.
Before discussing the merits of this decision, I wish to make the following observations :
(1) The decision of the learned trial Judge holding the witnesses in contempt of Court is a judgment that is susceptible of appeal, and is one that this Court may either confirm or quash.
(2) The refusal which provoked this judgment was a refusal to disclose information that the witnesses had acquired in the discharge of their official duties, and to produce documents prepared from this information or similarly acquired.
(3) The affidavit of the Hon. Dr. J. J. McCann, Minister of National Revenue, which was produced before this Court is to be treated as though it had been produced before the Superior Court. This affidavit reads :
“1. THAT I have taken communication of the Affidavit of V. W. T. Scully, then Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Taxation, sworn to on the first day of March, 1949, at which time I was Minister of National Revenue;
2. THAT the said Affidavit has my authorization and consent and, insofar as may be necessary, I hereby on my own behalf reiterate the averments and renew the objection contained therein.’’
(4) This appeal was not opposed, the petitioners in the Superior Court, respondents here, having filed a declaration of submission to justice.
Turning now to the merits, it may be noted that our attention was drawn to Section 81 of the Income War Tax Act, R.S.C. 1927, ce. 97, which reads:
“81. No person employed in the service of His Majesty shall communicate or allow to be communicated to any person not legally entitled thereto, any information obtained under the provisions of this Act, or allow any such person to inspect or have access to any written statement furnished under the provisions of this Act.
2. Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a penalty not exceedng two hundred dollars. 1917, c. 28, s. 11.”
and to Section 121 of the Income Tax Act (1948, 11-12 Geo. VI, ec. 52) which reads:
‘121. Every person who, while employed in the service of His Majesty, has communicated or allowed to be communicated to a person not legally entitled thereto any information obtained under this Act or has allowed any such person to inspect or have access to any written statement furnished under this Act is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $200.”
While these two sections differ somewhat in wording, for the purpose of this case they are identical in meaning. They prohibit any employee from divulging any information to any person not legally entitled thereto. But since in this case it was the taxpayer who asked for information concerning his own affairs, it is difficult to see how he could be regarded otherwise than as such a person. That evidently was the opinion of the learned trial Judge. It will be recalled that when the learned trial Judge first ordered appellants to testify he said ‘‘les déchargeant de toute responsabilité’’. With his conclusion on this point I am in full agreement.
But the right of the Department to object to the disclosure cannot, in this case at least, find its basis in these sections of the law. If this were the only justification put forward, I would not hesitate to confirm the judgment a quo. The objection however, was based on the broader principle that no officer of State can be compelled to disclose information when such disclosure would be against the public interest. This immediately turns us to C.C.P. 332, which reads:
“332. He (the witness) cannot be compelled to declare what has been revealed to him confidentially in his professional character as religious or legal adviser, or as an officer of state where public policy is concerned.”
I am satisfied that these two witnesses fall within the category of officers of state’’. Also that the information acquired by them, by word of mouth, inspection of documents or otherwise, was information obtained under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, and “solely for the information and use of the Taxa- tion Division of the Department of National Revenue and Officials of the Taxation Division engaged in the administration and enforcement of the Income War Tax Act.” It remains only to be decided whether a matter of public policy is concerned. If so, they could not be compelled to testify, and the judgment a quo must be quashed.
The learned trial Judge took the position that he alone had the right to decide whether a matter of public policy was concerned. He said it in his decision on the preliminary objection and again in the judgment a quo. By so doing he created the only issue involved in this appeal. In his work De la Preuve, Langelier, relying on the authority of Gugy v. Maguire, 13 L.C.R. 33 says at pagt 591:
“840. Mais à qui appartient-il de décider si la déclaration qu’on voudrait obtenir d’un fonctionnaire est contre l’intérêt public? C’est au fonctionnaire lui-même, et non au juge.”
The importance of the Gugy judgment, a decision of this Court, is shown in the opening paragraphs of the notes of Meredith, J., At page 51 he says:
“The Judges of this Court are all, I believe, agreed in the opinion that the Head of the Department of state cannot be compelled, at the instance of a private suitor, to produce an official document in his custody, when the production of the document would, on grounds of public policy, be inexpedient.
The question then arises: with whom does it rest to determine whether the production of a particular document is, on such general grounds, inexpedient? The majority of the Court hold that the Head of the Department having official custody of the paper is necessarily the proper person to determine the question, while one of the members of the Court (M. Justice Mondelet) maintains that it must be determined by the judge.
The general principles of law as well as the decisions of the Courts, both in England and the United States, appear to me to be entirely in favour of the opinion of the majority of the Court.’’
Since the decision in the Gugy case there have been others in the same sense. Reference may be made to Alain v. Belleau, 1 P.R. 98; Hebert v. Latour, 15 R.P. 5; Rheault v. Landry, 55 S.C. 1, and Boyer v. Boyer, 50 P.R. 174.
It appears to me that these decisions constitute a jurisprudence which supports the contention that it is only the head of a Department of State who is in a position and who has the right to decide whether the disclosure will be against the public interest, and the further proposition that no Court has the right to go behind the decision—in this case—of the Minister of National Revenue. It would require a very compelling reason to warrant any interference with this jurisprudence and to justify an opinion contrary to that expressed in these decisions. Neither in the judgment a quo nor elsewhere have I been able to find such a reason.
The learned trial Judge takes the position that the privilege claimed is one which exists in favour of, and for the protection of the taxpayer. If this is accepted, then it is reasonable to say that the taxpayer can waive it. But the privilege is not of this type. It is one in favour of the public interest, with the result that the nature of the information sought, that the taxpayer may wish to have it disclosed, that the dispute is between two private individuals, are all matters of no importance the moment the Minister declares that the information should not be disclosed.
In the case of Duncan v. Cammel Laird & Co. (1942), L.J.R. 406, it is pointed out that the refusal to disclose is sometimes based on the fact that the information is of a type which, on the broad rule of public policy and convenience, should be kept secret and that it is at other times based on the fact that it belongs to a class of information which should not be revealed. At page 412 we read:
“It will be observed that the objection is sometimes based upon the view that the public interest requires a particular class of communications with, or within, a public department to be protected from production on the ground that the candour and completeness of such communications might be prejudiced if they were ever liable to be disclosed in subsequent litigation, rather than upon the contents of the particular document itself.’’
This disposes of any argument based on the contention, no matter how well founded in other respects, that the information sought in this case is of no conceivable importance to anyone Save the parties concerned.
This view of the matter gives to the Minister far-reaching power and certainly makes possible situations in which the individual may suffer. But that argument, based as it is on the possible consequences of an abuse of power, or of an improper exercise of discretion, cannot destroy the broader principle that ‘‘a private inconvenience should be submitted to rather than introduce a public mischief’’. At the most it indicates the need of a remedy which could be supplied by the competent authority, or which perhaps already exists. Meredith, J., in the Gugy case (page 63), says:
. . . If the appellant thinks himself aggrieved by the decision of that officer, he may probably appeal to the Governor in Council, with a right of a further appeal to parliament; but if, we hold, the question, as to the production or non production of the paper, is to be determined by the secretary, then we cannot be called upon to pronounce any opinion upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the reasons urged for the nonproduction of the paper.’’
and perhaps this disposes of this aspect of the matter.
Also, while dealing with the consequences, it is not to be supposed that the Minister will in all cases find that the disclosure is against public interest. It is easy to conceive of cases in which the public interest will be better served by the disclosure than by the suppression. Of this we have an example in the case of Ship v. The King, 8 C.R. 26. In that case the Minister did not intervene. We can only suppose that he regarded it as one in which the balance was in favour of disclosure and by not intervening he left it to the Courts to decide whether those who sought the information were legally entitled thereto.
On the whole I am of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was not entitled to go behind the expressed opinion of the Minister. He should have accepted the statement that the disclosure would be against the public interest. Had he done so he would have necessarily recognized the witnesses as being non-compellable.
For these reasons I would maintain this appeal and annul the judgment a quo.
I feel that the costs should go against the respondents, Die- Plast Co. Ltd. and David Grobstein, the petitioners in the Superior Court. One cannot complain about their having issued the subpoenas and had they not insisted after the production of the first affidavit, I would have been disposed to allow this appeal without costs. However, the proces verbal discloses that after the initial objection had been made and dismissed, they asked that the witnesses be declared in contempt of Court. It seems to me that the respondents provoked the situation which then arose, and I think that they should be condemned to pay the costs before this Court.
GALIPEAULT, C.J.:—I readily agree with the reasoning of our colleague, Mr. Justice Casey, with whom I concur in granting the appeal and reverse the judgment.
BARCLAY, J.:—I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Casey. I wish, however, to make one reservation. We are here dealing with a Civil case and I reserve my opinion as to what might be decided in a Criminal case. As was stated by the Lord Chancellor in the Cammell Laird ease:
Judgment of the House of Lords in the present case is limited to Civil actions of the practice, as applied in Criminal trials where an individual’s life or liberty may be at stake, is not necessarily the same.’’
MARCHAND, J. :—I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Casey and, for the reasons expressed in his Notes, I would maintain the appeal.
EDGE, J.:—Pour les fins d’enquête, sur une requête dans laquelle David Grobstein est requérant en sa qualité de syndic à la faillite de Die-Plast Company Limited et Dorothy Myerson, Sol Levites et Nathan Myerson sont intimés, ceux-ci ont assigné comme témoins Arthur W. Gilmour, Directeur de l’impôt sur le Revenu et des Droits de Succession, et Dominic Vincelli, assesseur du Département de l’impôt sur le Revenu, ces témoins représentant le Ministre du Revenu National pour le Canada.
La requête avait pour objet d’établir l’existence d’un bail et de faire mettre de côté un acte de vente.
A l’enquête, comme on le constate par les déclarations de Vincelli et Gilmour, ceux-ci ont refusé de témoigner. Vincelli, d’une part, en déclarant que son serment de garder le secret lui défendait de témoigner et Gilmour, d’autre part, en déclarant qu’il ne pouvait produire aucun des documents et des rapports concernant la compagnie en faillite à raison des instructions qu’il avait reçues du Sous-Ministre du Revenue National et de son serment d’office.
En fait, un affidavit de V. Seully, Sous-Ministre du Revenu National a été produit et il atteste qu’il serait préjudiciable à l’intérêt publie pour Gilmour et Vincelli de témoigner relativement aux documents décrits dans le subpoena, parce qu’il y aurait violation des dispositions de L’Acte de l’impôt de guerre sur le revenu.
Le pétitionnaire demande a la Cour que Vincelli et Gilmour fussent déclarés en mépris de Cour.
Le Juge rejeta les objections du département et a déclaré que les témoins Vincelli et Gilmour devaine témoigner. Et c’est lorsqu’ils ont été appelés et entendus comme témoins que, au cours de l’enquête, il déclara chacun d’eux en mépris de Cour.
Le procureur du pétitionnaire a demandé de suspendre toute sentence afin de permettre au procureur du département de porter en appel la décision du Juge.
Après avoir pris connaissance des notes des Juges de la Cour d’Appel dans la cause Gugy v. Maguire, 13 L.C.R. 33, cette cause dispose du cas dont est appel, et plus particulièrement des notes élaborées de M. le Juge Casey, appuyées d’un grand nombre de décisions, je concours dans l’opinion de M. le Juge Casey et j’en viens à la conclusion suivante :
C’est au Ministre ou à toute autre personne en autorité dont un employé relève, et non à la Cour, qu’il appartient de décider si cet employé doit divulger les communications ou documents qui lui sont faits en sa qualité officielle.
Dans l’espèce, outre qu’un texte formel de l’Acte de l’impôt de guerre sur le revenu défend aux fonctionnaires du Département du Revenu National de faire connaître le contenu des rapports de l’impôt sur le Revenu, les témoins Vincelli et Gilmour tenus au secret sous leur serment d’office ayant reçu instruction d’une personne en autorité, le Sous-Ministre du Département du Revenu National, de ne rien divulguer de ce qui pouvait constituter le dossier de la Die-Plast Company Limited, la Cour ne pouvait les forcer à le faire, ni à produire aucun document s’y rapportant.
Je maintiendrais l’appel et j’adopte les conclusions dans les notes de M. le Juge Casey, quant aux frais.
Judgment accordingly.