Morand, J.:—This application arises by way of an application for an opinion of the Court upon the question raised in a special case concurred in by the parties pursuant to Rule 126 of the Consolidated Rules of Practice and deals with Section 126(2) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148. The said section reads as follows:
‘126. (2) The Minister may, for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of this Act, by registered letter or by a demand served personally, require from any person
(a) any information or additional information, including a return of income or a supplementary return, or
(b) production, or production on oath, of any books, letters, accounts, invoices, statements (financial or otherwise) or other documents,
within such reasonable time as may be stipulated therein.”
Pursuant to the said section the Minister issued a document to the Canadian Bank of Commerce on August 17, 1960 which in summary stated that for purposes related to the administration or enforcement of the Income Tax Act, pursuant to the provisions of Section 126(2) of the said Act, the said Minister required from the said Bank certain information and production of documents which in brief cover all information and documents covering a period of time from January 1, 1955 to December 31, 1959, of all dealings between the Union Bank of Switzerland and the Canadian Bank of Commerce. The applicant, the Canadian Bank of Commerce, issued a writ on September 15, 1960, asking for declaration that the requirement was unauthorized and of no force and effect and that the applicant is not subject to the penalty. The parties then agreed to state a special case for the opinion of the Court:
The special case in brief recites the facts hereinbefore set out and agrees that the applicant has failed to comply with the requirement. It then deals with the amount of time involved in obtaining the material required by the respondent and submits the following question for the opinion of the Court:
“Is the Plaintiff entitled to the relief claimed in the Writ of Summons herein, namely:
a declaration that it is not under any obligation to furnish the information or produce the documents relating to the accounts of its customer, The Union Bank of Switzerland, called for by the Requirement for Information and Production of Documents hereinafter described, that the said Requirement is unauthorized and is of no force or effect and that the Plaintiff is not subject to the penalty threatened therein for failure to comply therewith.’’
The applicant points out that it has a duty not to disclose, without due cause, the confidential dealings with their customers. It is, however, clearly established that where there is a disclosure under compulsion of law there is no liability upon the Bank. This was agreed by the parties hereto and that is one of the reasons for which this matter comes before the Court. It therefore follows that if an order for disclosure is made the Bank has satisfied the onus upon itself regarding disclosure with reference to confidential dealings.
It is the fundamental rule of interpretation that where a section of a statute is being interpreted it is to be given its natural and ordinary sense even though the result may appear harsh, arbitrary, burdensome or even contrary to some established rule of law. Section 126(2) on its face appears to be quite clear and unambiguous and I summarize as follows:
The Minister may for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of this Act require from any person, any information, etc.
It therefore appears clear that on reading of the section the intention of the Legislature was quite clear that the Minister was to have the powers as clearly set out in the section. This section is found under the heading ‘‘Investigations’’ and is part of a section of the Act dealing with the powers of investigation. Having decided that the section of the Act is quite clear, it then becomes necessary to decide whether the Minister has acted under the terms of the section. Firstly, the Minister must be acting for a purpose related to the administration or the enforcement of this Act.
It should be pointed out first that the Minister in issuing this requirement was acting in an administrative or executive capacity as opposed to a judicial one. It was admitted on the hearing of this motion that the Minister was acting in good faith and that this requirement relates to a genuine and serious inquiry into the tax liability of some specific person or persons; that the Minister had good reason to believe that such person or persons are among those referred to in the special case. The Minister refused to state who the person or persons were or to designate the person or persons in any way, shape or form.
It being admitted and not disputed that the Minister was acting in good faith and the requirement specifically stating that the requirement was issued for purposes related to the administration or enforcement of the Income Tax Act, it necessarily follows that he does require the information in question for a purpose “related to the administration or enforcement’’ of the Act. It was argued extensively before me that the mere statement by the Minister that he has such a purpose is not sufficient and that the Court must be satisfied that the condition precedent is, in fact, met. On the grounds above stated this argument must fail. In addition to the clear words of the section, if it were determined that in every case, the matter should go before the Court to determine whether or not the Minister was acting for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the Act, there would be complete disruption of the administration of the department resulting in delay and publicity.
In any event the cases cited to me suggesting the condition precedent must be proven before the Court, do not, in my opinion, deal with an action of this nature but deal with cases where such words ‘has reasonable cause to believe’’ and ‘‘is satisfied that it is requisite’’, etc., are used in the statute before the Court.
It was further argued before me by the applicant that there is a reasonable inference that some of the information required goes beyond any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the Act and that the whole requirement is bad. With due respect I cannot agree with this argument as by its very nature the Minister must obtain much irrelevant material in obtaining the important material required for purposes related to the administration or enforcement of the Act.
It was further argued before me that Section 126(2), despite its wide language, was not intended to permit an onerous requirement for production but is limited to obtaining specified information and production. I must admit this argument appealed to me, as to use the vernacular, it seemed unfair that the Minister could go on a “fishing expedition’’ and require a taxpayer to go to considerable expense, time and effort. However, the Minister alleges that he requires this information for the purposes related to the administration and enforcement of the Act and that there is specific information which he desires. I am, therefore, unable to come to the conclusion that it is a ‘‘fishing expedition’’ but find that the Minister does require certain specific information and feels that this is the way to obtain this information. Under the clear and very wide wording of the Act I have come to the conclusion that the Legislature did intend and did in fact give this authority to the Minister. Having so decided it is the decision of the Court that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief claimed in the writ of summons and must furnish the information and produce the documents as requested in the requirement dated August 17, 1960 and is subject to the penalty threatened therein for failure to comply therewith.
Under the circumstances, however, in so far as the penalty section is concerned, time will commence to run from the issuance of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.