The taxpayer’s husband, the proceeds of whose RRSP passed to her (and then to her plan) as a result of his death, had a tax debt on his death that exceeded such proceeds.
Russell J noted that, in similar circumstances in Kiperchuk, although “the question as to the meaning of the term ‘spouse’ in paragraph 160(1)(a) was not specifically posed” (para. 11), Lamarre J had briefly found that the spouse of her husband ceased to be a spouse on his death, so that a s. 160 assessment could not apply to her, whereas Kuchta had reached the opposite conclusion that in this context, “spouse” included a widow or widower, with the result that s. 160(1)(a) could apply.
Russell J indicated that Kuchta might technically be a nullity (because, as indicated in the comparable High-Crest decision, it had been decided by a substituted judge), but also indicated (a para. 42) that in Kuchta, “Graham, J. properly and diligently applied the textual, contextual and purposive analysis specified by … Canada Trustco in construing the meaning to be ascribed the term ‘spouse’ in paragraph 160(1)(a)” and that, in light of the principle of judicial comity, chose to follow the Kuchta interpretation so as to find that s. 160 applied to the taxpayer.