CATTANACH, J.:—This is an appeal from a decision of the Tax Appeal Board ((1965), 39 Tax A.B.C. 346) whereby the appellant was held to be associated with another corporation, namely, Heiland Exploration Canada (1959) Limited and therefore taxable as associated under Section 39 of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148 and amendments, for the appellant’s 1961, 1962 and 1963 taxation years.
At the outset of the hearing the appellant abandoned its appeal from the Board’s decision with respect to the assessment for its 1961 taxation year so that the present appeal relates only to the assessments by the Minister for the appellant’s 1962 and 1963 taxation years.
For the purpose of this appeal the parties reached an agreement as to the issue and facts which reads as follows :
1. The issue to be decided in each of the several appeals is whether the Appellant was or was not associated with Heiland Exploration Canada (1959) Limited (herein referred to as “Heiland”), in the relevant taxation year within the definition contained in subsection (4) of Section 39 of the Income Tax Act.
2. The following facts relative to the issue to be decided are admitted: —
(a) Heiland was incorporated under the Companies Act of the Province of Alberta on 1 June, 1954 and its fiscal period ended on 31 May in each year.
(b) The Appellant was incorporated under the Companies Act of the Province of Alberta on 19 December, 1960 and its fiscal period ended on 31 March in each year.
(c) At the date of the Appellant’s incorporation and throughout the period from that date until 21 July, 1962 all of the issued and outstanding shares of the capital stock of Heiland were owned by Mr. Ira C. Mayfield and his wife, Loma B. Mayfield, in the following portions :
Ira C. Mayfield 19 shares Loma B. Mayfield 1 share (d) Annexed hereto and marked as Appendix “A” to this agreement is a true copy of the Appellant’s Memorandum of Association as it read at all times material to these appeals.
(e) On the day following the date of the Appellant’s incorporation, Mr. Ira C. Mayfield and his wife, Loma B. May- field, were named as Directors of the Appellant and they continued to be the only Directors of the Appellant at all times material to these appeals.
(f) On 21 December, 1960, Mr. Ira C. Mayfield and his wife, Lorna B, Mayfield, each became the owner of 500 common shares of the capital stock of the Appellant and up to and including the 29th day of December, 1960, Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield were the only shareholders of the Appellant.
(g) On 30 December, 1960, 500 Class “B” shares of the capital stock of the Appellant were allotted to Mr. J. C. Fuller and 500 Class “B” shares were allotted to Mr. V. Van Sant, Jr., neither of whom was related to Mr. Ira C. May- field or to his wife, Loma B. Mayfield.
(h) Throughout the period commencing on 30 December, 1960 and ending on 20 July, 1962, the only issued and outstanding shares of the capital stock of the Appellant were owned as follows:
Name of Owner Common Shares Class “B” Shares Ira C. Mayfield 500 NIL Loma B. Mayfield 500 NIL J.C. Fuller NIL 500 V. Van Sant NIL 500 Total Shares 1,000 1,000 3. If it be decided that the Appellant was associated with Heiland in a taxation year, the appeal from the assessment for that taxation year of the Appellant should be dismissed.
4. If it be decided that the Appellant was not associated with Heiland in a taxation year, the appeal from the assessment for that taxation year of the Appellant should be allowed and the matter should be referred back to the Respondent to reassess the Appellant for that year at the rates of tax prescribed in subsection (1) of Section 39 of the Income Tax Act.
As recited in paragraph 2(d) there is appended to the agreement as to issue and facts a true copy of the appellant’s Memorandum of Association. The portions of the Memorandum pertinent to this appeal are those reciting the rights and conditions attaching to the common shares and Class “B” shares which read as follows:
The said Class “B” shares shall confer the right to notice of all meetings of the Company and the right to vote with the ordinary (common) shareholders and to have one vote for each class “B” share held by them”.
The said Class “B” shares shall be redeemable in whole or in part thereof at the option of the Directors upon any dividend date upon the company giving sixty days notice in writing of such redemption and shall be redeemable at par plus a sum equal to all unpaid preferential dividends in full to the date of redemption. In the event of such redemption being in part the same shall be by lot.
By agreement a true copy of the appellant’s Articles of Association as they read at all times material to this appeal were introduced in evidence. During argument reference was made to paragraphs 9 and 49 thereof reading as follows:
9. The shares shall be under the control of the Directors who by unanimous resolution and not otherwise may allot or otherwise dispose of the same to such persons and upon such terms and conditions and at such times as the directors think fit.
49. In the case of an equality of votes, either on a show of hands or on a poll, the Chairman of the meeting at which the show of hands takes place on at which the poll is demanded, as the case may be, shall not be entitled to a further or casting vote.
The shareholdings in the appellant and Heiland are illustrated in graphic form as follows:
The sole issue in the present appeal is, as stated in the agreement as to issue and facts, whether the appellant was or was not associated with Heiland in the appellant’s 1962 and 1963 taxation years.
Section 39(1) provides that the tax payable by a corporation under Part I of the Income Tax Act is 18 per cent of the first $35,000 taxable income and 47 per cent of the amount by which the income subject to tax exceeds $35,000. However, subsections (2) and (3) of Section 39 provide that when two or more corporations are associated with each other the aggregate of the amount of their incomes taxable at 18 per cent is not to exceed $35,000.
Section 39(4) defines the circumstances under which a corporation is associated with another and reads as follows:
39. (4) For the purpose of this section, one corporation is associated with another in a taxation year if, at any time in the year,
(a) one of the corporations controlled the other,
(b) both of the corporations were controlled by the same person or group of persons,
(c) each of the corporations was controlled by one person and the person who controlled one of the corporations was related to the person who controlled the other, and one of those persons owned directly or indirectly one or more shares of the capital stock of each of the corporations,
(d) one of the corporations was controlled by one person and that person was related to each member of a group of persons that controlled the other corporation, and one of those persons owned directly or indirectly one or more shares of the capital stock of each of the corporations, or
(e) each of the corporations was controlled by a related group and each of the members of one of the related groups was related to all of the members of the other related group, and one of the members of one of the related groups owned directly or indirectly one or more shares of the capital stock of each of the corporations.
The word ‘‘controlled’’ as used in the above subsection has been held by the President of this Court in Buckerfield’s Limited et al. v. M.N.R., [1965] 1 Ex. C.R. 229; [1964] C.T.C. 504, to mean the right of control that rests in the ownership of such a number of shares as carries with it the right to a majority of the votes, i.e. de jure control and not de facto control. This interpretation by the President was adopted with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in M.N.R. v. Dworkin Furs (Pembroke) Ltd. et al., [1967] C.T.C. 50.
The contention on behalf of the Minister is, as I understood it, that each of the corporations here involved, namely, the appellant and Heiland, was controlled by a ‘‘related group’’ and are accordingly associated within the meaning of Section 39(4) (e). It was conceded by counsel for the appellant that (e) is the applicable paragraph of subsection (4) of Section 39 but he did not concede that the appellant was controlled by a related group.
It is not disputed that Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield, by virtue of their ownership of all the issued and outstanding shares of Heiland in the respective numbers of 19 and 1, controlled that corporation.
If the test propounded in the Buckerfield s case (supra) was the test here applicable then there would be no question that the appellant was not controlled by Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield because between them they owned only 50 per cent of the issued and outstanding voting shares of the appellant and therefore did not command a majority of the votes.
There is no question between the parties that Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield constituted a ‘‘related group’’ within the meaning of those words as defined in the Income Tax Act.
Subsection (4a) of Section 39 reads as follows:
(43.) For the purpose of this section,
(a) one person is related to another person if they are “related persons” or persons related to each other within the meaning of subsection (5a) of section 139;
(b) “related group” has the meaning given that expression in subsection (5c) of section 139; and
(c) subsection (5d) of section 139 is applicable mutatis mutandis.
Subsection (5) of section 139 reads as follows:
(5) For the purposes of this Act,
(a) related persons shall be deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length; and
(b) it is a question of fact whether persons not related to each other were at a particular time dealing with each other at arm’s length.
Relationship is defined in subsection (5a) of Section 139 reading in part as follows:
(5a) For the purpose of subsection (5), (5c) and this subsection, “related persons”, or persons related to each other, are
(a) individuals connected by blood relationship, marriage or adoption ;
Subsection (50) of Section 139 reads in part as follows:
(So) In subsection (5a), (5d) and this subsection
(a) “related group” means a group of persons each member of which is related to every other member of the group ; . . .
The contention of the Minister is that Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield are a related group of persons who are deemed to have controlled the appellant by virtue of paragraph (b) of subsection (5d) of Section 139 or alternatively that the appellant was controlled by a related group of persons comprised of Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield because at all material times they were in a position to cause all or part of the Class B shares of the appellant to be redeemed and thereby become the majority shareholders. He contends that by virtue of paragraph (a) of subsection (5(1) of Section 139, where a related group is in a position to control a corporation, that group shall be deemed to be a related group that controls the corporation.
Section 139(5d) reads in part as follows:
(5d) For the purpose of subsection (Sa)
(a) where a related group is in a position to control a corporation, it shall be deemed to be a related group that controls the corporation whether or not it is part of a larger group by whom the corporation is in fact controlled;
(b) a person who had a right under a contract, in equity or otherwise, either immediately or in the future and either absolutely or contingently, to, or to acquire, shares in a corporation, or to control the voting rights of shares in a corporation, shall, except where the contract provided that the right is not exercisable until the death of an individual designated therein, be deemed to have had the same position in relation to the control of the corporation as if he owned the shares;
In my view paragraph (b) of subsection (5d) of Section 139 has no application in the facts of the present appeal. Under that paragraph a person in order to be deemed to be in the same position in relation to control of a corporation as if he owned the shares, that person must have a right under a contract, in equity or otherwise (1) to the shares, (2) to acquire the shares, or (3) to control the voting rights of the shares. The only conceivable right which Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield may have had under the redeemable feature attaching to the Class B shares in the appellant would be to bring about, by corporate action, the cancellation or elimination of those shares which is a right entirely different from a right to those shares or to acquire those shares. The voting rights attaching to the Class B shares were vested in the holders thereof, namely, Mr. Fuller and Mr. Van Sant, Jr. who were strangers, in the tax sense, to Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield. There is no suggestion in the agreed statement of facts, not was any evidence adduced to suggest, that Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield had any right by contract, in equity or otherwise to exercise any control over the voting rights of the Class B shares. The clear implication is that the voting rights of those shares were the sole prerogative of the holders thereof. Therefore none of the conditions precedent to a person being deemed to be in the same position in relation to control of a corporation as if he owned the shares as contemplated by paragraph (b) of subsection (5d) of Section 139 is present here.
With respect to paragraph (a) of subsection (5d) of Section 139, counsel for the Minister points out that immediately following the incorporation of the appellant, Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield were the only shareholders, each of whom held 500 common shares and, being the only shareholders, they became the only directors. As directors and by virtue of the authority vested in them by paragraph 9 of the Articles of Association, they caused to be issued 500 Class B shares to Mr. Fuller and 500 Class B to Mr. Van Sant, Jr. Because of the equality of votes so resulting, Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield could perpetuate themselves in the positions of directors. As directors they could issue additional shares to themselves or redeem Class B shares and so ensure control in themselves by reason of holding the preponderance of voting power. From these circumstances counsel for the Minister submits that while Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield are a related group, with equal voting power to the other shareholders, and so are not in control of the appellant, nevertheless by virtue of the authority vested in them by the Memorandum of Agreement and Articles of Association as directors, from which position they could not be ousted, they could change the balance of voting power should they so desire and accordingly they are ‘‘in a position of control”? the appellant within the meaning of those words where they appear in Section 139 (5d) (a). Therefore, he contends, Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield are deemed to be a related group that controls the appellant.
After giving careful consideration to the argument of counsel for the Minister I cannot accede to the correctness of the proposition upon which his contention is based. In my view the words ‘‘in a position to control’’ must refer to a presently existing ability to control by voting power attached to ownership of shares, rather than being in a position to acquire or obtain such control predicated upon some future act such as the redemption of Class B shares.
Furthermore, the act of redeeming Class B shares is the act of the corporation even though that action could be instigated by Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield in their capacity as directors.
To me the language of Section 139 (5d) (a) contemplates the circumstance where a group of persons each of which is related to the other by blood relationship, marriage, adoption or otherwise as outlined in Section 139 (5a) is in a position to control a corporation by reason of their collective holding of a majority of the voting power in shares, even though they might be part of a larger group of persons who are also so related and who, in fact, exercise control of the corporation. Such a related group, which is part of a larger related group, being in a position to control a corporation by ownership of a majority of the voting shares, is deemed to be a related group that controls the corporation even though the members thereof do not, in fact, do so to the exclusion of others to whom they are also related.
It follows therefore that the appellant and Heiland were not associated and that the appeal with respect to the appellant’s 1962. and 1963 taxation years is allowed. The matter is referred back to the Minister for re-assessment accordingly. The appellant is entitled to its costs to be taxed in the usual way.
randum (undated) from the :accountant, Mr. Edington, setting out the manner of the proposed, sale.,
Letter dated March 16, 1963, from B; V: Massie o. F. G.
Missiaen, Square M. Construction Ltd, giving an opinion as to the proposal to acquire the shares of Edeco Canada Ltd. and shareholders loans.
Undated memo (working notes) in longhand, covering proposed
purchase of some shares of Edeco Canada Ltd. and an option on others. , '- “ / /
Similar memorandum setting out: proportionate number of
shares to be acquired by each of the applicants.
Memorandum in green ink, undated; (although March 6, 1963,
appears in body of it) setting out the various documents to be prepared for the purpose of the sale.
The application comes to this court pursuant. to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, ce. 148, Section 126A (4) (added 1956, c. 39) on notice to the Deputy Attorney-General of Canada for determination of the question whether the client has a solicitor-client privilege in respect ()f. the documents.
The documents were seized for a purpose related to the administration and enforcement of the Income Tax Act and to determine the amount of the tax properly payable by Edeco. Canada Ltd. and certain shareholders thereof, which is deposed to in the affidavit of John F. Flaman, a special investigator for the department of national revenue, to which a number‘ *of exhibits are attached, setting out the pertinent. information. about the capital structure of Edeco Canada Ltd. and the share position. The affidavit also outlines the particulars of the sale of certain shares in Edeco Canada Ltd. to the :applicants,: the priée and some other relative correspondence, including copies of, documents seized from the possession of the firm of chartered’ accountants in Edmonton, acting for the parties, It is clear the applicants were purchasing, the. shares: in Edeco anada. Ltd. with some prospect of using them. to gain a, tax benefit.. , r
In principle, the taxpayer is entitled to take any steps, within the law, to avoid tax or putting it the other way, So as not to attract tax. The taxpayer incurs-no censure if he can walk outside the lines drawn by the legislature for the imposition of taxes: Levene v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1928]?. A.C^ 217 at 227; 97 L.J.K.B. 377:
I wish, however, to point out the position in which Mr. Levene and others like him now find themselves. It is. trite. law that His Majesty’s subjects are free, if they can, to make , their own arrangements, so that their cases may fall outside the scope of “the taxing Acts. They ineur no legal penalties and, strictly speaking, no moral censure if, having considered the lines drawn by the Legislature for the imposition of .taxes, they make it their business to walk outside them.
: The privilege as between solicitor-client only extends to consultation for the purpose of advice; Minter v. Priest, [1930] A.C. 558; 99 L.J.K.B. 391. At p. 568 Lord Buckmaster points out the mere fact that a person is a solicitor and the person to whom he speaks is a client, is not enough. Also, records produced for some purpose, - communicated by third parties, e.g. an accountant to solicitor in answer to an inquiry, are not privileged. In ether. words, there must. be a professional element made out, giving rise to the claim for privilege: O’Shea v. Wood, [1891] Pi: 286 at 289; 60 L.J.P. 83. However, in my view, documents herein fall within this category, with the exception of the undated letter from the accountant and the notes in green ink prepared by the accountants.
The deputy attorney-general, through his counsel, submits that in the correspondence between the auditors, namely, Touche & Company, and the English clients, it is evident that there is an attempt to evade tax. Using the word ‘‘attempt’’ in a general sense does not impute anything improper or illegal. Under the Income Tax Act, Section 138(6), it is provided:
138. (6) An avoidance or reduction of taxes may be regarded as improper for the purpose of this section although it is not illegal.
If I were able to come to the conclusion that there was anything fraudulent or criminal or illegal about the effort being made by the applicants to gain some tax advantage, I would regard the claim to privilege as being avoided: See Reg. v. Cox and Railton (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 153; 54 L.J.M.C. 41 (headnote) :
All communications between a solicitor and his client are not privileged from disclosure, but only those passing between them in professional confidence and in the legitimate course of professional employment of the solicitor. Communications made to a solicitor by his client before the commission of a crime for the purpose of being guided or helped in the commission of it, are not privileged from disclosure.
On the other hand, in order to get rid of the privilege there must be something to give colour to the charge and there must be some foundation in fact to the claim. There has been nothing improper or sinister in the so-called attempt to evade tax and the assumption on which the claim of the minister is founded, I think is not substantiated, and the common-law privilege accorded correspondence and documents has not been lost. The applicants will therefore be entitled to the return of these docu- ments and I order the sheriff to return them accordingly. The deputy sheriff handed me the sealed file with the correspondence in question, which I will return to the deputy sheriff and the remaining documents in the file, i.e., those to which privilege has been waived and those I have found not to be privileged, will be returned to the custody of Mr. John F. Flaman.
While no claim was made to privilege of the correspondence between the client and the chartered accountant acting for the applicants, and there is no provision in the Income Tax Act to provide such privilege, it would appear there is some merit in such a claim. In re William W. Kask, [1966] C.T.C. 659, Wilson, C.J. succinctly sets out the principles upon which the solicitorclient privilege exists. Certainly, the chartered accountant. with the client is in an analogous position to a solicitor and his client and it is rather strange that no privilege is accorded or claimed in such circumstances.
HELEN E. MITCHELL, Executrix of the Estate of the late ANGUS A. MITCHELL, Appellant,
and
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE, Respondent.
Exchequer Court of Canada (Sheppard, D.J.), November 30, 1967, on appeal from a decision of the Tax Appeal Board, reported 40 Tax A.B.C. 213.
Income tax—Federal—Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148—Section
The deceased had paid his daughter’s university fees and his estate claimed the right to deduct them under Section 11(1) (qb) in computing his income.
HELD:
The maxim of noscitur a sociis applied and. Section 11(1) (qb) could be construed as the words explicitly stated, to permit an allowance to a taxpayer who was a student [and not to the person who paid the fees]. Appeal dismissed.
CASES REFERRED to :
In re National Savings Bank Ass’n. (1866), L.R. 1 Ch. App.
497 ;
Ebbs v. Boulnois (1875), L.R. 10 Ch. App. 479.
P. N. Thorsteinsson and M. J. O’Keefe, for the Appellant.
T. E. Jackson, for the Respondent.
SHEPPARD, D.J.:—This appeal raises only a point of law, namely, the meaning of Section 11(1) (qb) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148 as amended.
In 1963, a father paid his daughter’s tuition fees and his Executrix, the appellant, claims to deduct that payment from the father’s income by virtue of Section 11(1) (qb). The Minister contends that the section applies only to cases where the taxpayer is a student and the payment and deduction are by a student. The subsection then in force (1960-61, c. 17, Section 2(1) enacting Section 11(1) (qb)) reads as follows:
(qb) where a taxpayer was during the year a student in full-time attendance at a university in a course leading to a degree, or in full-time attendance at a college or other educational institution in Canada in a course at a post-secondary school level, the amount of any fees for his tuition paid to the university, college or other educational institution in respect of a period not exceeding 12 months commencing in the year and not included in the calculation of a deduction under this paragraph for a previous year (except any such fees paid in respect of a course of less than 13 consecutive weeks’ duration) ;
The appellant contends :
(1) That ‘‘a taxpayer’’, the second and third words, should be read as “a person” or ‘‘any person’’ because the definition of a taxpayer reads:
“ taxpayer’ includes any person whether or not liable to pay tax;”
(Section 139 (1) (av) )
and
(2) That “by him’’ is implied after the word “paid” as meaning that the sum to be deducted must be paid by the father, the taxpayer.
In support of her contention the appelant also referred to numerous subsections of Section 11 where the words ‘‘the taxpayer” are used which necessarily refer to ‘‘a taxpayer’’ mentioned in the preliminary words of Section 11(1) as the one whose income is being computed for a taxation year : see Section 11(1) (a), (cb), (ed), (e), and when ‘‘a taxpayer’’ is used in Section 11 there are other words which indicate they relate to “a taxpayer’’ mentioned in the preliminary words of Section 11(1) as the one whose income is being computed. Therefore the appellant contends that as such other words are not to be found in paragraph (qb) ‘‘a taxpayer’’ should be read as ‘‘any person’’, and in the result the section should be construed to mean that where ‘‘ any person was during the year a student .. . . the amount of any fees for his tuition paid by him (the taxpayer, here the father) . . . ”
That contention fails for various reasons. ‘‘ A taxpayer” is not defined simpliciter as ‘‘a person’’, and the definition merely means that a ‘‘person’’ to be a taxpayer need not be a payer but that definition does not excuse such ‘‘person’’ from having the other incidents of a taxpayer, which in this instance would. include the considering of what “may be deducted in computing the income of a taxpayer’’, the preliminary words of Section 11(1). Hence the definition does not permit the substitution of ‘any person”? for the words ‘‘a taxpayer” in Section 11(1) (qb).
Further, where the words ‘‘the taxpayer” are used in Section 11(1) they refer to ‘‘a taxpayer’’, which is the precise term in the preliminary words of Section 11(1). Therefore, whether he be described as ‘‘the taxpayer” or ‘‘a taxpayer” the words equally refer to the same person mentioned as ‘‘a taxpayer’’ in the first part of Section 11(1), that is, the one whose income is being computed. Here ‘‘the taxpayer” and ‘‘a taxpayer” are equivalent. In In re National Savings Bank Association (1866), *.R. 1 Ch. App. 547, Turner, L.J. at p. 550 said:
. . . I am quite satisfied that no sufficient reason can be assigned for construing the word “contributory” in one part of the Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of the Act.
(36 Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.) p. 396, para. 595.)
The words ‘‘by him’’ which the contention implied after “paid” in Section 11(1) (qb), must refer to the nearest antecedent to which they could reasonably refer and here to “student”, particularly as the preceding words ‘‘for his tuition’’ necessarily refer to “student”. Such construction defeats the contention of the appellant, as it would only permit a deduction to a student for his tuition paid ‘‘by him’’. To avoid such construction the contention must add after “paid” some additional words such as those following; ‘‘by the taxpayer referred to as ‘a taxpayer’ in the preliminary part of Section 11(1)’’. However, that is adding words to the section, which is not permissible (36 Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.) p. 382, para. 570). The additional words qualify “paid” in a way that is not found in the section and is required only by the appellant’s contention.
That contention of the appellant would lead to unreasonable meanings as follows:
(1) “Any person’’ could pay the whole of his taxable income to universities for students’ tuition and thereby claim the right to deduct under Section 11(1) (qb) the amount so paid even to escape the paying of any income tax. It is rather difficult to see what interest a ‘‘person’’ could have in paying the tuition fees of complete strangers, or the intention of the statute to protect such non-existing interest of the taxpayer.
(2) That contention would conflict with the payments for a child that may be deducted under Section 26(1) which requires that the child be a dependent of the taxpayer. There seems to be no reason why the intention should be inferred that the taxpayer under Section 26(1) should have a restricted right to deduct for his own children only if they be dependent but have as “a person’’ under Section 11(1) (qb) an unrestricted right to pay the tuition for his children and for strangers. It is not permissible to give one section its full meaning and to compress the remainder of the statute into any gaps that may remain, but the whole statute must be read, that is, construed together to avoid such conflicts: 86 Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.) p. 395, para. 994. In Ebbs v. Boulnois (1875), L.R. 10 Ch. App. 479, James, L.J. at p. 484 said:
Common sense must be applied to reconcile the two enactments. It is a cardinal principle in the interpretation of a statute that if there are two inconsistent enactments, it must be seen if one cannot be read as a qualification of the other.
The words of Section 11(1) (qb) contain an express and clear meaning. The following sections should be read together as being contiguous and being then current subsections of the statute. Section 11(1) (q) (enacted 1956, c. 39, Section 3(5)) provided, where a taxpayer is a member of the clergy . . .’’; Section 11(1) (qa) (enacted 1956-57, c. 29, Section 4 (3)) provided ‘where a taxpayer is a teacher . . .’’; Section 11(1) (qb), the section in question (enacted 1960-61, c. 17, Section 2(1)) provided, “where a taxpayer was during the year a student . . . ”’
These subsections are evidently intended to authorized specific deductions to specific groups; by Section 11(1) (q) to clergymen for their residence, by Section 11(1) (qa) to teachers for certain contributions, and by Section 11(1) (qb) to students for certain tuition. The maxim noscitur a sociis applies and therefore the subsections should be uniformly construed as providing for the allowance to a special group of taxpayers, and under such maxim, Section 11(1) (qb) can be construed as the words explicitly state, in permitting an allowance to a taxpayer who is a student within that subsection, for the tuition fees therein specified.
It follows that the contention of the Minister should be accepted and the appeal dismissed.