PIGEON, J.:—The appellant is a solicitor who, over a period of years, acquired some 13 mortgages, usually at a substantial discount. He was assessed for income tax in 1962 on $700 being the amount of a discount on one of these mortgages that he collected at maturity in that year.
Before the Tax Appeal Board, the assessment was upheld on the finding, not that it was profit from a “business”, but that ‘‘it was a quasi-bonus and therefore “interest per se .
In the Exchequer Court, Gibson, J. did not wish to pass on the soundness of that conclusion and did not choose (those are his words) to make a finding that this was profit from a “business”. He expressly founded his decision in favour of the Minister on the basis that this ‘‘was income from a source within the meaning of the opening words of Section 3 of the Income Tax Act ’, adding :
as far as I know, there is no decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court of Canada in which a question of this kind has been resolved by deciding that such a discount was income from a “source” within the meaning of the opening words of Section 3 of the Act, without deciding whether it was income from any of the particular sources detailed in Section 3 or elsewhere in the Act.
From this judgment, appellant filed an inscription in appeal to this Court as of right without apparently realizing that, due to the rate of tax applicable, the actual amount in controversy was less than $500. Respondent also appears to have overlooked the point and did not move to quash but, on the contrary, signed an agreement as to contents of case and did not object to the appeal being inscribed for hearing at the last term. Being No. 17 on the Ontario list, the case was not called before the vacation. In June, however, appellant became aware of the doubtful jurisdiction and, on June 13, gave to respondent a notice of motion supported by affidavit which was filed the following day. This notice was ‘ ‘ that an application will be made to this Honourable Court or to a Judge of this Honourable Court on the day when this appeal comes on for hearing for leave to appeal to this Honourable Court, if such leave should be necessary, . . .”’
The parties have now appeared before me and argued the application before the case will be called. Counsel for the respondent agrees that the amount in controversy is under $500 and is a ‘‘sum of money payable to Her Majesty” within the meaning of paragraph (b) of Section 83 of the Exchequer Court Act (R.S.C. 1952, ¢. 98) but otherwise he opposes the application.
In view of the importance of the question of law involved in the decision sought to be appealed from, I consider it desirable that it should be reviewed by this Court and accordingly grant leave to appeal. ‘“
In doing so, I must point out that, although this Court sometimes under special circumstances gives leave to appeal at the time an appeal is heard, it is very inconvenient and highly undesirable that applications for leave should be made at such a late date. Especially is this so when, as in this case, the jurisdiction for granting leave is conferred not on the Court but. on a judge. The orderly disposition of the business of the Court requires that applications for leave be brought promptly. Also, when a case is inscribed without jurisdiction, it is respondent’s duty to move to quash if applicant does not move for special leave.
Under the circumstances, there will be no costs of the application to either party.