MUNROE, J.:—Application by the executors of the estate of Percival Archibald Woodward, deceased, for an order to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue to remove into this court a certain record of determination made by the Minister of Finance of the Province of British Columbia on May 1, 1969 under the provisions of the Succession Duty Act, R. S. B. C. 1960, Chapter 372 and amendments thereto.
Mr. P. A. Woodward died on August 27, 1968. He left an estate valued for succession duty purposes of about $4,450,000. Under his will, Mr. Woodward established a trust fund to provide for his widow and bequeathed the residue of his estate (amounting to something in excess of $4,000,000) to a Foundation known as the ‘‘Mr. and Mrs. P. A. Woodward’s Foundation”. That Foundation was incorporated. on October 29, 1951 under the Societies Act exclusively for charitable objects to be carried out in the Province of British Columbia. For the 18- year period ending December 31, 1968 it donated $1,822,368 for such purposes, of which all but $1,000 was. giypn to universities, hospitals, religious or other charitable organizations within the province.
After the executors had filed their Affidavit of Value and Relationship, the Minister of Finance on May 21, 1969 made a ^determination” under Section 20 of the Act, assessing succession duties payable under the Act in the amount of $1,730,536.88. He thus assessed the residuary gift to. the Foundation as if it were a bequest not to a ‘‘charitable organization”? but, rather, to a ‘‘stranger’’. From that assessment the executors appealed to the Minister pursuant to the provisions of Section 43. They complained of two things : first, an error in what was included in the widow’s portion, and second, the failure to exempt the gift to the Foundation as being a charitable gift. In response to such notice of appeal, a Revised Assessment was issued on July 21, 1969. It gave effect to the first ground of complaint but continued taxing the gift to the Foundation as one to a “stranger”. Since there is no such thing as a “Revised Assessment’’ provided for in the Succession Duty Act, the executors were in some doubt as to its legal effect. Accordingly, on August 27, 1969, they issued a further Notice of Appeal to the Minister under Section 43 of the Act. That brought no response. After waiting for something further to happen, the executors decided to treat the Revised Assessment as being the decision of the Minister under Section 43(4). Accordingly, being dissatisfied with the decision of the Minister, the executors appealed therefrom on September 11, 1969, to a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia under Section 44 of the Act. The hearing of that appeal came on before Aikins, J. on December 8, 1969. A preliminary objection was taken by the Crown, of which notice was given on December 3rd, to the effect that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear such appeal because no decision had then been made by the Minister under Section 43(4), and accordingly there was in effect no decision against which the Foundation could appeal. His Lordship gave effect to that submission and dismissed the appeal. On January 6, 1970, an appeal was launched from that ruling to the Court of Appeal and service of the Notice of Appeal was completed by January 14, 1970. By February 5, 1970 the Appeal Book had been filed and the date for the hearing of the appeal confirmed. The Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia met on January 22, 1970. On February 6, 1970, the Minister of Finance introduced Bill 11, ‘‘An Act to Amend the Succession Duty Act’’. The Bill so introduced was enacted and came into force on April 1, 1970, and is now Chapter 45 of the Statutes of British Columbia, 1970. By virtue of the combined effect of the amendment to Section 5(2) of the Act and Section 12(4) of the amending Act, the right of appeal by the Foundation to the Minister under Section 43 and to this Court under Section 44, was removed. When the appeal from the judgment of Aikins, J. came before the Court of Appeal on May 14, 1970, the executors conceded that the substratum of their appeal which, if successful, would have had the result of returning the proceedings to Mr. Justice Aikins with a direction that he decide upon the merits, was gone. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed.
From the material filed upon this application, it is apparent that the Minister on or about May 1, 1969, acting under Section 5(2) of the Act, had ‘‘determined’’ that, for the purpose of Section 5(1) of the Act, the Foundation is not a religious, charitable, or educational organization and that, also for the purpose of Section 5(1) of the Act, the purpose of the Founda- tion is not a religious, charitable, or educational purpose, despite
the fact that the Foundation was incorporated under the Societies Act of British Columbia exclusively as a charitable organization to carry out such purpose within British Columbia and had functioned as such since its incorporation. The Foundation has , always been and is now exempt from payment of tax under the
Income Tax Act of Canada and the Income Tax Act of British Columbia, as a “charitable organization”.
Under Section 5(1) of the Succession Duty Act of British Columbia, gifts of the type bequeathed by Mr. Woodward or other persons to the Foundation ‘‘for religious, charitable or educational purposes’’ and such gifts bequeathed to a “religious, charitable or educational organization ” are exempt from liability to pay succession duty. From 1963 until April 1, 1970, Section 5(2) of the Act read as follows:
For the purpose of subsection (1), the Minister, in his absolute discretion, may determine whether any purpose or organization is a religious, charitable, or educational purpose or organization.
The position immediately prior to the coming into force of the 1970 amendments to the Succession Duty Act appears to have been as follows:
May 1, 1969—The Minister determined under Section 5(2) that the bequest to the Foundation did not qualify under Section 5(1) for exemption from succession duty, but did not advise the Foundation or the executors of the estate of such determination.
May 21, 1969—An assessment of duties was issued which reflected such determination.
June 19, 1969—The executors appealed to the Minister from such assessment, under Section 43.
July 21, 1969—A revised assessment of duties was issued, but that assessment did not reflect a decision made by the Minister under Section 43, according to counsel who appeared on his behalf before Mr. Justice Aikins, and succeeded upon that ground alone.
It thus appears that no decision has yet been rendered upon the appeal taken to the Minister under Section 43, and none will be rendered in the future because on April 1, 1970, Section 5(2) of the Act was amended by adding, at the end, the following :
and the determination of the Minister is final, conclusive and binding on all persons and, notwithstanding section 43 or 44 or any other provision of this Act to the contrary, is not open to appeal, question, or review in any Court, and any determination of the Minister made under this subsection is hereby ratified and confirmed and is binding on all persons.
At the same time, Section 12(4) was enacted, reading as follows:
(4) Section 5 shall be deemed to have come into force on the first day of April, 1968, and is retroactive to the extent necessary to give full force and effect to the provisions it amends on or after that date, and applies to property passing on the death of a person dying on, from, and after that date.
Counsel for the applicant asks that the gift to the Foundation be declared exempt pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(1) (11) of the Act which exempts from succession duty such gifts ‘‘bequeathed by any person for religious, charitable, or educational purposes to be carried out in the Province’’, asserting that the Minister of Finance lacks jurisdiction to make the determination which he made under Section 5(2) in respect of such gift. He submits that, in law, the said gift to the Foundation qualifies for exemption under Section 5(1) and that no determination made by the Minister under Section 5(2) can deprive the Foundation of its status as a charitable organization or deprive a bequest to it of its exemption under Section 5(1). He argues that while Section 5(2) authorizes the Minister to determine whether any purpose or organization is a religious, charitable, or educational purpose or organization, it does not authorize him to say it is not. In short, while he may confer a status or grant an exemption, he may not deprive an organization or purpose of its charitable purpose or nature. He says support for the foregoing propositions is to be found in the legislative history of the Act, and particularly the amendments made to Section 5 in 1963. I must and do reject such submission. It is trite law to say that the intention of the Legislature and, therefore, the meaning of the statute is primarily: to be sought in the words used in the statute itself, and that plain, unambiguous words must be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning. As I interpret Section 5 of the Act, the Legislature has granted to the Minister of Finance the sole right and the duty to determine whether or not, for the purpose of determining liability or exemption from succession duty, the Foundation or its purpose is a religious, charitable, or educational purpose or organization. In my view, the ‘‘whether’’ in Section 5(2) implies a choice between ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’. For the purpose of Section 5(1) of the Act, the Foundation had no status either as or not. as a religious, charitable or educational organization until the Minister made his determination under Section 5(2), regard- less of its status for other purposes at common law or under home other statute law.
Assuming the correctness of such conclusions, there arises next for consideration the allegation of the applicants that the Minister lost the jurisdiction given to him by the Act when he made his determination under Section 5(2) without notice to the executors of the estate, contrary to the principles of natural justice. Counsel for the Minister conceded during the hearing that no such notice was given and conceded also, rightly I think, that when the Minister made such determination he was exercising judicial or quasi-judicial duties, particularly in the light of the 1970 amendments: Giese v. Williston (1963), 41 W.W.R. 331. Accordingly, the law is clear that he must act in good faith and give a fair opportunity to the executors and to the Foundation for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view: Board of Education v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179; Western Mines Ltd. v. Greater Campbell River Water District (1967), 58 W.W.R. 705.
As was said by the learned President. of the Exchequer Court of Canada in Randolph et al. v. The Queen, [1966] Ex. C.R. 157 at 164:
It is a general rule that, unless Parliament has, in a particular class of matters, otherwise provided, every person has a right to be heard and to be given a fair opportunity for correcting or contradicting what is alleged against him before an order is made against him. This is a fundamental rule of British justice that is read into statutes conferring power to make decisions. It applies not only when the power to make decisions is conferred upon judicial tribunals constituted as such, but whenever such a power is conferred upon administrative agencies, Ministers of the Crown or other purely executive authorities. The rule only applies, however, in the absence of any express statutory rule to the contrary, to decision making powers conferred by statute that are of the kind sometimes referred to as being of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature because they are primarily directed to the determination or abrogation of rights of members of the public by application of a statutory rule to the facts of a particular case as determined by the tribunal. In other words, the rule that I am discussing does not apply to decisions that are primarily of any administrative or executive nature in the sense that they are arbitrary because they are made having regard primarily to public policy or exediency considerations but does apply to decisions as to individual rights arrived at by ascertaining facts and applying some rule or principle of law to them.
Here, no opportunity to be heard was given and such failure constituted a denial of natural justice, which ousted the jurisdiction of the Minister; and certiorari is available as a remedy unless the amendments have the effect of depriving this Court ()f any jurisdiction to review the determination made by the Minister. Counsel for the Minister so asserts, relying.on the words added to Section 5(2) in 1970. I reject such submission. It has been held repeatedly in Canadian courts that enactments which purport to oust or deprive the court of jurisdiction to review the judicial or quasi-judicial acts of a person or tribunal exercising a discretionary althority under a statute are ineffective for that purpose where a breach of the principles of natural justice has 0€€111°°,1€d and that is so even where the enactment has provided that the decision of such person or tribunal is final and that he or it shall not be restrained by certiorari or otherwise by any court: Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co., [19538] S.C.R. 18; Saltfleet Board of Health. v. Knapman, [1956] S.C.R. 877; Battaglia v. Workmen’s Compensation Board (1960), 32 W. W. R. 1, Judicial Review of Adminis- trative Action (2nd ed.) by S. A. de Smith at pp. 344 et seq.-, Re Rammell (1962), 37 W.W.R. 49. However, counsel for the Minister submits that the words ‘‘and any determination of the Minister made under this subsection is hereby ratified and confirmed and binding on all persons ’ ’ make the principles of law above referred to inapplicable to this case. He says, in effect, that the determination of the Minister is valid and binding and not subject to review in any court, notwithstanding that in arriving at his decision the Minister may have contravened the principles, of natural justice. He says that the words ‘‘any determination” means just that—a determination made lawfully or otherwise, which determination, however much it may violate legal principles, must stand because it has been ratified in advance by the Legislature. I reject that submission. The Legislature could not ratify or confirm a determination that was not then in existence any more than it could ratify, confirm or make binding a determination: which was a nullity at law. A determination made, as this one was, in breach of the principles of natural justice, is void. Counsel says, and I agree, that the Legislature is supreme when enacting legislation within its, constitutional. powers. It could have enacted legislation saying that for the purpose of Section 5(1) of the Succession Duty Act, the Foundation is not a charitable organization and does not have a charitable purpose and that would ave. been the en of the matter; but it did not do that.. Instead, it authorized and directed the Minister to decide which (if any) organizations claiming to be charitable organizations are such for the purpose of Section 5(1) of the Act. It granted such discretionary power having the constructive know ledge that it is an established principle of law that such discretion must be exercised judicially. As Lord Blackburn said in Young. v. Mayor of Leamington (1883), 8 App. Cas. 517 at 526: -
We ought in general, in construing an Act of Parliament, to assume that the legislature knows the existing state of the law.
In the result, I hold that the power given by Section 5(2) of the Succession Duty Act to the Minister of Finance is a power to. be exercised judicially and is not an arbitrary’ one to be exercised capriciously according to his fancy: : M.N.R. v: Wrights’ Canadian Dopes : Ltd., [1947] C.T.C.f Ridge V. Baldioin, [1964]
A.C. 40. . :
In view of the conclusions which I have reached. it is unnecessary for me to adjudicate upon grounds numbered (2) and
(4) in the Notice: of Motion: The application for a declaration that the gift of the residue of the estate of Mr. Woodward to the Foundation is exempt from succession duty is not granted. A writ of certiorari will issue; the determination made under Section 5(2) of the Act by the Minister of Finance on or about May 1, 1969, shall be quashed on return without further order. The matter will be referred back to the Minister for the exercise of his discretion on proper legal principles.
Application granted.