John Reid v. Minister of National Revenue, [1972] CTC 2661, 72 DTC 1540

By services, 21 December, 2022
Is tax content
Tax Content (confirmed)
Citation
Citation name
[1972] CTC 2661
Citation name
72 DTC 1540
Decision date
d7 import status
Drupal 7 entity type
Node
Drupal 7 entity ID
667491
Extra import data
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"field_full_style_of_cause": "John Reid, Appellant, and Minister of National Revenue, Respondent.",
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Style of cause
John Reid v. Minister of National Revenue
Main text

The Assistant Chairman:—The appeal of Mr John Reid from an assessment of his 1967 and 1968 taxation years was heard in Montreal on November 2, 1972. The appellant claimed deductions of $5,504 for 1967 and $4,387 for 1968 as alimony paid to his former wife. Both claims were disallowed.

Counsel for the appellant claimed that the payments were made by reason of a written agreement pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(l) of the Income Tax Act and were therefore admissible. The document which counsel produced as a written agreement is headed “Suggested Child Support” (Exhibit A-1). It is undated and unsigned. On the back of the document the word “accepted” is written and there is what I assume to be Mr John Reid’s signature. No date is mentioned as to when Mr Reid’s signature was apposed to the document.

Paragraph 11(1)(l) of the Income Tax Act refers to alimony as an amount paid by the taxpayer in the year pursuant to a decree, order or judgment of a competent tribunal or pursuant to a written agreement. These words, in my opinion, must be interpreted strictly and the words “written agreement” in a context which includes a decree, order or judgment of a competent tribunal must, of necessity, mean a formal agreement between the parties concerned.

Counsel for the appellant went into an interesting discussion as to what constitutes a “writing” or a “written document” as defined by the Civil Code and the Interpretation Act, and concluded that the “Suggested Child Support” document (Exhibit A-1) was a “written document” within the meaning of paragraph 11(1)(l) of the Income Tax Act.

In my opinion, whether the said document is a “writing” or a “written document” or whether the appellant did or did not pay amounts of alimony according to Exhibit A-1, it cannot be considered a formal, binding, legally acceptable written agreement within the meaning and purpose of paragraph 11 (1)(l).

Case law is quite consistent on the point and, to my mind, rightly so when one considers the abuse that could be made of a wider interpretation of the term “written agreement”. Even if the rules of interpretation would permit a wider interpretation to include letters, memoranda and suggestions between husband and wife, which I am convinced they do not, the whole purpose of paragraph 11(1)(l) would be jeopardized.

For these reasons the appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.