Robins, Griffiths, Osborne, JJ.A.: — The question in this appeal is whether the factual circumstances are such as to provide a valid basis in law for permitting the appellant to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of income tax evasion on which he was convicted on April 8, 1986. In our opinion, no grounds have been established which would justify the Court in striking out the plea and ordering a new trial at this stage.
The appellant is himself a lawyer and was represented by experienced defence counsel throughout the prosecution of the charges against him. It can be accepted that he was suffering from extreme stress at the time of trial, not only as a result of the income tax charges, but as a result also of disciplinary charges before the Law Society and a number of civil lawsuits against him. Nonetheless, he participated in the preparation of the statement of facts which was put before the Court and upon which the conviction was registered and the joint submission as to sentence was made. The statement was carefully redrafted by the appellant and his counsel so as not to indicate any professional misconduct involving his clients that could prove prejudicial to him in the pending discipline proceedings. The material before us does not indicate any inaccuracy in the statement.
It is clear from the transcript, and, in particular, the comments of counsel, that the appellant intended to admit the facts contained in the agreed statement which proved that he committed the offence charged, and agreed to a conviction being entered without a trial. It is also clear that he did not misapprehend the effect of the guilty plea. The fact that his trial counsel was forceful in asserting his view that the appellant's mental condition was such that he should plead guilty is not a basis for setting aside the plea. Mr. Carter, it might be added, does not contend that any “improper pressure" was exercised by trial counsel.
We think it significant that this appeal was not launched until after the appellant had served his sentence (although his monetary fine remains in large part outstanding) and his problems with the Law Society and in the civil courts had been determined. It is also significant that no application was made to the trial court to postpone the trial on the basis that the appellant's mental or emotional condition precluded him from defending himself against the charges, as it is now alleged. Nor has any evidence been presented to this Court as to the state of the appellant's mental health at the time of trial notwithstanding that counsel appearing for the appellant on the application to extend the time for appeal (not Mr. Carter) advised the Court that such evidence would be forthcoming on the appeal.
The appeal will accordingly be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.