Stratton, J.A.:—The sole issue in this appeal addresses the meaning of the word "filed" as it appears in subsection 36(1) of the Alberta Corporate Tax Act, c. A-17 R.S.A. 1980.
The material part of that section reads as follows:
A return for each taxation year of a corporation . . . shall be filed bY or on behalf of the corporation with the provincial treasurer . . . within six months from the end of the taxation year.
It ‘is common ground that the appellant, a taxpayer bound by this section, mailed its 1988 corporate tax return by registered mail from the United States to the respondent on June 30, 1989, and that this return was received by the respondent on July 13, 1989.
Nor is it disputed that June 30, 1989 was the last day of the six-month period referred to in subsection 36(1).
The respondent imposed on the appellant a late filling penalty as provided by the Act and, in so doing, has taken the position that the appellant’s return must be considered as having been filed only when it is received by the respondent. The appellant contends that it is filed, for the purposes of the Act, when it is mailed, and on that basis the appellant would not be subject to a late filing penalty.
The appellant appealed the respondent's decision to impose the penalty to Queen's Bench. Madam Justice Rawlins held that the word “filed” in the Alberta Corporate Tax Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. A-17, is
. . . clear and unequivocal and connotes the requirement of actual delivery before filing and therefore a mailed document is not considered "filed" until it is received and not at the point of mailing".
That decision has now been appealed to this Court.
The appellant’s principal argument is that a review of the legislative history of the Alberta Act supports its contention that filing is accomplished upon mailing. Counsel pointed to the fact that the comparable provisions of predecessor Acts to the current Alberta Act required a corporation to "deliver"a return by a given date to the appropriate provincial authority. The appellant's argument is that the fact that the earlier Acts were amended in 1961 by substituting the word "filed" for "delivered" indicate a clear intent that the concept of requiring actual delivery to the provincial authority was no longer accepted.
We disagree for a number of reasons.
Firstly, we adopt the words of Chief Justice Tindal in the Sussex Peerage Case as quoted in Driedger on Construction of Statutes (second ed., page 2):
. . . if the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.
This is surely a first principle of statutory interpretation and, as did the learned trial judge, we also find no ambiguity in the use of the words “filed with the provincial treasurer" as used in subsection 36(1). In fact, we find those words to be clear and precise as did Mr. Justice MacCallum in a recent (1991) decision in Queen’s Bench, namely Bruce Lake Farms Ltd. v. The Provincial Treasurer (Q.B. Case No. 8903-17111).
It also should be noted that various provisions of the federal Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148 (am. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63) (the "federal Act") are incorporated by reference into the Alberta Act. In 1986, however, the Alberta Act was amended by subsection 2(10) which expressly provided that subsection 248(7) of the federal Act did not apply "for the purposes of the Alberta Act". Subsection 248(7) of the federal Act provided that for the purpose of the federal Act:
Anything sent by mail shall be deemed to have been received by the recipient on the day that it was mailed.
This amendment addressed the section of the federal Act which, like the Alberta Act, required filing by a certain date.
Although not decisive on the question now before us, we find the Alberta amendment to be instructive as to the intent of the Legislature, namely to negate the concept that mailing equated with the filing.
Finally, in answer to the appellant's argument that the Legislature intended a change in its position vis-a-vis the receipt of a return when it changed the word “delivered” to "filed", we point to subsection 33(2) of the Interpretation Act of Alberta, R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-7 which specifically negates such conclusion.
We also point out, as observed by the Court during the course of argument, that administrative guidelines are not determinative of legislative intent and accordingly the statement in the 1988 Alberta Corporate Income Tax Return to which counsel for the appellant referred us, is not persuasive. In any event, the specific guideline referred to in that comment does not address the meaning of "filing" for the purposes of the Alberta Act.
Accordingly, we all agree, for the foregoing reasons, that the appeal should be dismissed.
Costs will follow the event.
Appeal dismissed.